INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to discover whether or not the criminal law in Australia has failed to promote the right to life for unborn children, and if so, how. It will also examine closely the lack of uniformity in Australia's criminal law in the area of abortion 1 to see if it plays a part in undermining the rights of unborn children. In particular, the article will examine whether there is a need for effective uniform criminal laws throughout Australia that properly protect the right to life for unborn children and are duly sensitive to the valid health interests of pregnant women that give rise to circumstances justifying abortion.
2
To examine this subject closely, this article will analyse a number of key questions. Firstly, it will look at the question of whether or not unborn children have rights, and in particular, the right to life. After all, if we wish to advocate effective criminal laws to safeguard unborn children, it must be known why they are worth protecting. Secondly, the article will look at exceptions that make it permissible for unborn children's rights to life to give way to the essential welfare of pregnant women. 3 Thirdly, the article will critically examine specific areas of legislation in Australian 'pro-choice' jurisdictions and 'pro-life' jurisdictions. It will also look at how the criminal law on abortion has been applied in cases to determine whether or not the courts contribute to any failure of Australian law to promote the right to life of unborn children. Finally, the article will formulate a legal policy recommendation in support of the right to life for unborn children that could form the basis of future discussion with a view to law reform across Australia in the area of abortion crimes.
II THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE -WHY IT IS WORTH PROTECTING THE LIFE OF AN UNBORN CHILD
The polarising views of the pro-life and pro-choice camps on the abortion debate centre upon whether a human foetus is a child from the moment of conception or whether it is simply a collection of cells dependent on, and an extension of, a pregnant woman's body. 4 This article does not seek to resolve this matter; neither camp has any irrefutable argument to offer the other to resolve this ideological conflict. 5 What both sides may agree on, perhaps, is a criminal offence to procure a miscarriage; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 82-4, which makes it a criminal offence to procure a miscarriage. 2 See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 153, 162-5 (1973) . 3 See generally Rebecca Dean, 'Erosion of Access to Abortion in the United States: Lessons for Australia ' (2007) 12(1) Deakin Law Review 123, 127-8. 4 See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (Harper Collins Publishers, 1993) 10. 5 Ibid 10, 30. What is perhaps a better notion of intrinsic value is one that incorporates the idea of human life being valuable based on its usefulness to others. 17 This notion is pragmatic and simple to apply in a legal context. 18 With regard to an unborn child, society protects that life because of its assessment of the usefulness of that life to the community. 19 The issue with the law is its artificial evaluation of the worth of an unborn child based on his or her 'present condition'; this is a patently flawed method of assessing the worth of human life. The law governing abortion attributes value to an unborn child based on which trimester he or she has progressed to. 20 However, an unborn child's value to society based on his or her potential future use -which by its very nature is contingent -is a truer valuation of unborn children. 21 This can be illustrated by the practical example of people investing in shares or property; such investment is not valued by the investor on the basis of the investment's present value, but on the basis of its potential future value -a potential that may or may not materialise. Yet the very significant potential value of unborn children, which crystallises at the moment of conception, 22 is largely obscured by the law differentiating the value of unborn children during the phases of their development. 23 This article suggests that the intrinsic value of an unborn child arises from the moment of conception and this intrinsic value is based on the potential use this life has to other human beings. The article also suggests that this notion of intrinsic value should form the basis of legal policy on the criminality of abortion, and that references in criminal statutes to discrete periods in the prenatal stage which attribute different value to the unborn child should be removed. In this way, from the moment of conception an unborn child could be treasured and offered real protection by the criminal law. This is a far cry from the current situation in Australia. A number of jurisdictions still differentiate the worth of unborn children based on their gestational ages, 24 17 Lazarev, above n 9, IV. 18 See ibid IV. 19 See ibid. 20 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 163-5 (1973); Dean, above n 3, 127-8, 157- and this serves to undermine the protection the criminal law offers unborn children. This defect in the law can be remediated through a legal policy position that recognises the intrinsic value of unborn children from the moment of their conception.
The question now turns to what rights are properly ascribed to an unborn child in law.
B Rights in Law of the Unborn
What is interesting in a legal sense is that the law throughout the world is not uniform in ascribing rights to unborn children. The rights of unborn children vary between nations. 25 To illustrate this point, it is worth very briefly contrasting Australia's position in this area with that of Ireland and also looking at what international law has to say on this subject.
Ireland has taken a very strong legal stance in the protection of unborn children, and this is perhaps due largely to its staunch Catholic culture. 26 The Irish Constitution confers a right to life and offers legal protection for unborn children. Explicitly, the Constitution provides that the 'State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right'. 27 Whilst this constitutional provision ostensibly affords the opportunity for women to access abortion -for example, in instances where continuing pregnancy may jeopardise the life of the mother -the provision is about the unborn child's right to life and not the woman's right to choice. 28 What the example of Ireland shows is that some nations recognise that unborn children have a right to life in their prenatal state. 31 The stark difference between Ireland and Australia is that, under its common law, Australia holds that the rights of unborn children do not exist prior to their birth. 32 That is to say, a child becomes a 'legal person'-with the ability and entitlement to enforce his or her legal rights -only upon being born alive. 33 For example, in the case of Watt v Rama, 34 a plaintiff sued for disability caused by the defendant's careless driving, which resulted in a collision with the car the plaintiff's mother was driving whilst the mother was pregnant with the plaintiff. 35 The collision caused very serious injuries to the plaintiff's mother and disability to the plaintiff. 36 The court established that the defendant had a duty of care to pregnant women and the children they were carrying via the 'reasonable foreseeability' test, that the defendant could breach this duty of care to an unborn child (via careless driving), and that damage (disability) to the child could arise after birth. However, it was only upon her birth that the plaintiff's injuries could be sustained by her as a 'legal person' and thus only then that she had a cause of action for negligence. 37 That is, if an unborn child is injured, the child's cause of action 'crystallises' upon the injured child's birth, 38 which is to say that the damage only exists when the child is born alive in a damaged condition. 39 What is significant about this case is that the court recognised that a duty of care is afforded to unborn children and thus they are worth protecting, even though the court qualified this duty by imposing the requirement that the child must be born alive. 40 The point nevertheless remains that in the case of abortion, the 'born alive rule' is of no use in supporting the right to life of unborn children. Australia, by comparison to Ireland, largely lacks the unequivocal legal protection given by the state to unborn children. 31 Ibid. Note that a similar situation exists in the Philippines - The significant differences in the rights of unborn children across different nations are perhaps symptomatic of the nature of the law. The classification of the foetus and its rights is the work of 'legal fiction'. 41 Whilst the law might be informed by science, its pronouncements are not scientific. 42 In many cases, the law departs from science and creates its own conceptions of what constitutes a 'legal person' in whom rights can be invested. 43 The 'born alive' rule is no exception -in fact, its attractiveness to jurists is perhaps based on the simplicity of the rule rather than its scientific accuracy in classifying the development of unborn children. 44 The position of international law with regard to the rights of unborn children could be inferred from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art 6(5), which Australia has ratified. 45 The ICCPR provides that the '[s]entence of death shall not be … carried out on pregnant women'.
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It is implicit in that statement that unborn children are protected and have a right to life, which cannot be violated by any state. 47 The significance of this is that the ICCPR is a binding treaty for those nations that choose to ratify it 48 'and must be performed by them in good faith'. 49 However, in Dietrich v The Queen the High Court of Australia observed that ratification of the ICCPR 'has no direct legal effect upon domestic law; the rights and obligations' under the ICCPR do not become Australian law 'unless and until specific legislation is passed implementing the provisions'.
50
In other words, the right to life of unborn children does not exist under Australian law simply because the Australian executive government has 41 ratified the ICCPR; rather, domestic legislation must be passed to achieve this result. 51 However, treaties may influence the development of the common law. In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) the High Court of Australia commented that 'international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights'. 52 Thus, we can see treaties operating to give courts insight into international community values and standards which the courts can use to develop the Australian common law and resolve its inherent ambiguities. 53 We are perhaps seeing this played out in the evolution of rights for unborn children as a result of biomedical developments. 54 Such developments have forced a sharp rethink of the 'born alive' rule and whether it is still maintainable that a prenatal child has no right of its own.
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Whatever the developments in Australian law with regard to ascribing rights to unborn children, they have not been uniform 56 and they fall far short of the Ireland model. 57 Countries such as Ireland have determined that it is worth protecting the lives of unborn children and so have enshrined this protection in their constitutions and given this protection legal effect in their domestic criminal statutes. 58 Australia's position is that a 'foetus cannot … have a right of its own … until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother'. However, there appears to be a shift in this position, catalysed by recent developments in biomedical science, which are compelling a re-think of this 'born alive' rule. Such a shift has materialised in certain protections for unborn children. 60 Nevertheless, the law's response in this area has been reactionary, ad hoc, non-uniform and at this stage somewhat rudimentary 61 -certainly a far cry from the definite position of Ireland.
This article concludes that Australia's law offers a measure of protection to an unborn child, but not to the same extent as in other countries such as Ireland. Ireland recognises an unborn child's right to life and has enshrined that right in its Constitution and criminal law. It is fair to say that Australia deems it is worth protecting the lives of unborn children, but the protections that exist are heavily qualified and perhaps undermined by the 'born alive' rule.
III EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO LIFE FOR UNBORN CHILDREN

A General Exceptions in Law
The traditional justification for abortion is necessity. 62 That is to say abortion is justified in circumstances where it is 'necessary to preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health'. 63 So the protection of unborn children is not without limitations.
In common law, the principle of necessity as a defence to a crime is justified on the basis that, on occasions, following the law may bring on greater harm than breaking it. 64 The basic elements of the defence are that: the criminal act was necessary or at least reasonably believed to have been necessary to avoid or prevent death or serious injury; necessity must be an essential element of the criminal act; and the criminal act was reasonable and proportionate to the harm sought to be avoided.
At common law the necessity defence was traditionally available for all crimes except murder. 66 Whilst this article will not debate the issue of whether or not abortion is murder, the question of whether the defence of necessity can be applied to abortion cases in Australia has been largely answered in the affirmative. 67 Specifically, the defence of necessity is applicable in determining whether or not therapeutic abortion is lawful. 68 The issue with using the necessity principle to justify abortion is that the right to life of an unborn child is pitted against the significant health interests of his or her mother. 69 In such circumstances, society must make its choice on the value of each -the mother and unborn child 70 -and when it does so, the earlier discussion on the intrinsic value of an unborn child is quite useful. It is plain that the very significant potential value of an unborn child to other human beings 71 must give way to the actual value of his or her mother when the life of the mother or both is threatened. 72 It is therefore important that any legal policy underpinning the criminalisation of abortion incorporates the law of necessity. Where the mother's life or her physical or mental health is in serious danger, therapeutic abortion is justified based on necessity. 73 With this position stated, it is useful to examine and contrast the current laws in Australia justifying abortion.
B Specific Exceptions for the Protection of Pregnant Women
The 1969 Victorian case of R v Davidson 74 is of particular significance in this discussion because it established the legal principle by which abortions proscribed under law could be justified. The case concerned a criminal prosecution under s 65 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 75 for a therapeutic abortion. In dealing with that case, the Court established the basis on which abortions could be carried out without offending the law. The court ruled that to determine whether or not a therapeutic abortion is lawful under section 65:
76
[T]he principle to be applied is the principle of necessity, importing the elements of necessity and proportion to the mischief to be prevented and the requirement of honest belief on reasonable grounds on the part of the accused that his act was necessary.
77
That is, to lawfully terminate a pregnancy, a doctor must reasonably believe that such an operation is necessary to 'preserve the woman from serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health'. 78 Significantly, the court held that the relevant dangers need not be 'the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth', but include other physical and mental factors which could jeopardise the woman's health. 79 The significance of this last part of Menhennitt J's ruling is evident when it is contrasted with a tragic case in Ireland.
In 1992, an Irish abortion case captured international attention and aroused debate. 80 The case concerned a 14 year old rape victim who conceived from the rape and was prevented from travelling to the United Kingdom (UK) to obtain an abortion. 81 The Irish Attorney-General obtained an interim injunction in the Irish High Court to prevent the girl from leaving Ireland on the grounds that this would protect the unborn child's right to life. 82 However, the pregnancy posed a serious risk to the young mother's life; she was suicidal as a result of the pregnancy. 83 The controversy surrounding the case centred on the competing rights of the unborn child and mother -the unborn child's right to life versus the mother's right to be rid of the mental stress of the pregnancy that was endangering her life. 84 Amidst the controversy, the Irish Supreme Court eventually lifted the injunction as a result of the efforts of the young mother's family. 85 Australian case, and highlights the very sensible balance the court in R v Davidson 86 achieved when resolving the problem of the competing interests of unborn child and mother. If the Irish court had applied the principles set out in R v Davidson, 87 it can be concluded that the Irish case would have been quickly settled in favour of the young mother. An abortion is not a frivolous matter -it is an act that should be considered only when necessity dictates, and such necessity would have been deemed to have arisen in the circumstances of the young Irish rape victim plagued with suicidal tendencies due to her pregnancy.
Whilst Victoria legalised abortion in 2008,
88 the R v Davidson 89 judgment concerning the principle of necessity is nevertheless very persuasive in other jurisdictions such as Queensland and New South Wales (NSW) when these jurisdictions apply their respective criminal statutes on abortion. 90 In the NSW case of R v Wald, 91 the principle of necessity -as applied to abortion cases per R v Davidson 92 -was followed and its focus sharpened by Levine DCJ. Levine DCJ elaborated on the scope of the test by commenting that:
[I]t would be for the jury to decide whether there existed in the case of each woman any economic, social or medical ground or reason which in their view could constitute reasonable grounds upon which an accused could honestly and reasonably believe there would result a serious danger to her mental or physical health. It may be that an honest belief be held that the woman's mental health, although not then in serious danger, could reasonably be expected to be seriously endangered at some time during the currency of the pregnancy.
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The contrast between this decision and the aforementioned Irish case is quite stark. In that case, reasoning of the kind used in R v Wald 94 This article strongly advocates the use of the principle of necessity as a legal 'safety valve', so that abortions are permitted only under the particular conditions stipulated by Menhennitt J and Levine DCJ. 97 These conditions provide an effective test by which the rights and needs of pregnant women can be properly balanced against the right to life of unborn children and thereby ensure that abortions take place for serious and not frivolous reasons.
By way of illustration, to highlight how a treatable minor medical problem could be used to justify an abortion, it is worth mentioning a recent Italian abortion incident that has attracted pointed criticism. In this incident, a 22 week old infant was found breathing and left by doctors to die in an Italian hospital after a botched abortion operation. 98 The child was discovered alive some 20 hours after the abortion operation by the hospital chaplain who raised the alarm. 99 The child died the following day in intensive care. 100 The poignant fact in this incident is that the first time pregnant mother opted for the abortion after discovering the unborn child had a cleft lip and palate -a condition that could be effectively treated by surgery. 101 The circumstances of this tragic incident highlight the need to ensure that the principle of necessity is the guiding legal principle in controlling when it is appropriate for an abortion to take place; this legal principle will ensure that the intrinsic value of unborn children and their right to life are not seriously undermined by allowing abortions for trivial reasons. 95 Ibid. 96 
IV CRIMINAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA DEALING WITH ABORTION
A Jurisdictions Promoting Choice for Pregnant Women
There are three Australian jurisdictions that currently promote choice for pregnant women with regard to abortion. 102 This article will deal with twoVictoria and the ACT. These two are sufficient for the purpose of determining whether or not the criminal law across Australian jurisdictions on the subject of abortion lacks sufficient effective uniformity to properly safeguard unborn children.
103 Western Australia, the third jurisdiction, was the first to reform abortion law in 1998 in favour of a pro-choice position. 104 It is perhaps more worthwhile, therefore, to look at the two more recent abortion law reforms in Victoria and the ACT. 105 After all, legislators in these jurisdictions considered the Western Australian model in formulating their own reforms. Prior to the 2008 amendments, the Crimes Act 132 implicitly recognised the intrinsic value of human life from the moment of its conception. It did so through proscribing abortion during any stage of a pregnancy. 133 The Crimes Act 134 also implicitly recognised the right to life of unborn children -a right that was protected through criminal sanction for those intending to injure that right. 135 Whilst the Crimes Act 136 did not directly deal with circumstances justifying abortion, the courts drew on the principle of necessity in describing such circumstances. 137 By all measures, it would seem that the criminal law in Victoria prior to its amendment in 2008 had the necessary elements to promote the right to life for unborn children. However, in 2008 this legislative and case law regime protecting unborn children dissipated with the passing of the Abortion Law Reform Act.
138
The Abortion Law Reform Act 139 has the effect of subjecting the right to life of unborn children to the discretion of their mothers. 140 Section 11 141 replaces the abortion offences under the Crimes Act 142 with new provisions. Section 65 143 now provides that it is only illegal for 'unqualified persons' to perform an abortion. 144 Section 65(2) 145 explicitly states that a pregnant woman who consents to or assists in the carrying out of an abortion on herself by an unqualified person is not guilty of an offence under the section. 146 Section 66 147 now provides that common law offences concerning abortion are abolished. 148 Section 4 149 provides that a doctor can perform an abortion on a woman who is not more than 24 weeks pregnant. All these statutory provisions make it possible for a woman not more than 24 weeks pregnant to get an abortion for any reason whatsoever, without any regard to the intrinsic value of the child she is carrying or the unborn child's right to life, or any concern for the proportionality of her actions, a proportionality that would bear on the principle of necessity.
150
Victoria's shift in 2008 towards supporting the 'pro-choice' position by legalising abortion was driven by community attitudes calling for women to 'have unrestricted access to abortion on demand' 151 and for there to be 'legal certainty on the circumstances in which an abortion is legal'. 152 Notwithstanding community values, it is this article's contention that the Victorian government should not have wilted in the face of 'pro-choice' community sentiments, but should have instead stood firm in its opposition to abortions that are undertaken for frivolous reasons. The law as it stands now in Victoria renders the life of an unborn child virtually worthless when pitted against the wide discretion of the child's mother.
Interestingly, public sentiments 153 also expressed the view that abortions should not be carried out after 20 weeks of pregnancy for non-medical reasons, that is, for reasons such as financial or emotional stress. 154 This demonstrates that the community places significant value on an unborn child in an advanced state of development. However, to fix a point in time in which a foetus has merited protection by virtue of its supposed development has very little scientific basis and represents no more than a legal fiction. 155 How can one say that a foetus at 19 weeks can be aborted at the mother's discretion whilst a foetus at 20 weeks can be aborted only where necessity arises? Can society fix a time when a foetus first makes a detectable movement in the womb, 156 when a foetus is 'viable', 157 when a child first speaks, first walks, first progresses out of nappies, or first reads? These are all developmental phases that cannot be properly fixed in time. 158 So community views that hold a foetus to be more valuable (and thus more useful to society) at a particular point in time are bound to be contentious; 159 the better approach is to recognise the intrinsic value of an unborn child from conception 160 and apply the principle of necessity to govern when abortions are permissible during any point of the pregnancy. 161 Unfortunately, the law in Victoria is far from ideal in this regard. Section 5 162 provides that a foetus of more than 24 weeks cannot simply be aborted at the private discretion of its mother. 163 Instead, a pregnant woman wishing to abort her unborn child after 24 weeks of pregnancy is required to have approval from two doctors who reasonably believe 'the abortion is appropriate in all the circumstances'. 164 In determining what is appropriate in all the circumstances, the doctor must have regard to 'all relevant medical circumstances' 165 and 'the woman's current and future physical, psychological and social circumstances'. 166 These provisions place limits on a woman's discretion to abort her unborn child during pregnancy 167 and they reflect -in the case of unborn children of more than 24 weeks -the sentiments expressed in R v Davidson 168 and R v Wald 169 where abortion is justified only by reason of necessity. 170 The problem with this stance is that it creates an artificial distinction between when an unborn child is merely a part of a woman's body and when he or she is of sufficient worth to warrant state protection.
171 Such a distinction fails to recognise and respect the intrinsic value of an unborn child 158 from conception and to afford him or her the necessary protection he or she deserves when in a vulnerable condition throughout the whole prenatal period.
This article contends that the better approach would have been to apply the same protection given to a foetus of more than 24 weeks to a foetus of up to 24 weeks. The reality is that less than one per cent of abortions take place after 20 weeks of pregnancy. 172 Therefore, to provide a safeguard akin to the principle of necessity for a foetus of more than 24 weeks is of some value, but would not prevent the majority of abortions. Over 99 per cent of unborn children who are at risk of being aborted will receive no protection from the state (that is, Victoria in this case). 173 The position in Victoria is quite starkthe criminal law currently fails to promote the right to life for unborn children.
Australian Capital Territory
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was the first Australian jurisdiction to decriminalise abortion. 174 This occurred in 2002 when the ACT instituted the most liberal laws in Australia in advancement of the pro-choice agenda. Prior to its decriminalisation, abortion in the ACT was a crime, as it was in Victoria, NSW and Queensland. 177 Under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), 178 abortion was a serious crime with severe penalties. 179 Notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence of abortion, it was generally held that exceptions grounded in the principle of necessity, discussed in R v Davidson 180 and R v Wald, 181 regulated the permissibility of abortions in the ACT. 182 It can be said that the ACT had a very robust legal regime to safeguard the lives of unborn children -a regime that permitted abortion only under circumstances of necessity where the health of the mother was at serious risk. 183 This safeguard was further bolstered by the operation of the Health Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 (ACT); this Act provided that women wishing to access abortion in circumstances of necessity must be provided with information regarding foetal development 184 and the medical risks associated with an abortion. 185 The main purpose of the compulsory provision of this information was to ensure that a woman's decision to abort her child was carefully considered with particular and implicit regard to the impact that the abortion would have on the life growing inside her. 186 However, the Act's 187 provisions also served to delay the process of obtaining an abortion. 188 Taken together, the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 189 and the Health Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 (ACT) provided a solid foundation for the protection of the right to life of unborn children in the ACT.
This solid regime of protection for unborn children was stripped almost bare in 2002 when the ACT repealed not only the criminal provisions concerning abortion, 190 but also the Health Regulation (Maternal Information) Act 1998 (ACT). 191 The only remaining protection for unborn children sets in at the point the foetus attains 'viability'. 192 Under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) section 42, it is an offence to commit 'child destruction', which occurs 'when a person unlawfully prevents a child from being born alive'. 193 This provision is interpreted as applying only to a viable foetus or one that is capable of being born alive. 194 The definition of 'unlawful' is found in R v Wald 195 and it applies in circumstances where the termination of the viable foetus takes place for reasons other than necessity. 196 The problem with this 'protection' is the lack of precision concerning when during the pregnancy it becomes operative. 197 With ongoing advances in medical technology and practice, the point of viability is constantly shifting. 198 The collective conclusions of parliaments and courts in various Australian jurisdictions on this subject indicate that the point of viability ranges between 22 and 28 weeks of pregnancy. 199 Therefore, uncertainty as to viability coupled with the fact that over 99 per cent of abortions take place prior to 20 weeks of pregnancy 200 renders this provision 201 virtually useless and therefore leaves the right to life of unborn children in the ACT with virtually no protection.
The situation as it stands in the ACT is such that the lives of unborn children are essentially subject to the discretion of their mothers. The law fails to recognise the intrinsic value of human life from its conception and fails to afford it any proper protection. From the perspective of an unborn child's interests, the ACT in 2002 had taken a quantum leap backwards from a position previously supportive of an unborn child's right to life. Indeed, '[t]he ACT has lighted the way towards abortion being a right, and … taken a crucial step towards … the feminist utopia'. 202 Together, Victoria and the ACT represent a 'gaping hole' in the protection of an unborn child's life in Australia, an issue that will be discussed later in this article.
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B Jurisdictions Promoting Protection for Unborn Children
There are five Australian jurisdictions that currently promote an unborn child's right to life. 204 The two that this article will focus on are NSW and Queensland, for the reason that judicial decisions in these States have tested the respective abortion crime provisions. 205 The other three jurisdictions are the Northern Territory, Tasmania and South Australia. 206 However, before looking at specific jurisdictions, it is worth first looking at the position of the common law with regard to abortion. After all, the two prochoice jurisdictions discussed earlier -Victoria and the ACT -deemed it necessary to ensure that their respective abortion law reform legislation specifically repealed common law abortion offences. 207 
Common Law Protection of Unborn Children
The common law's regulation of abortion is somewhat unclear 208 due to the fact that abortion has been governed by the operation of statutes since as early as 1803 in England. 209 However, it appears certain that an abortion after quickening is a common law offence. 210 That is, the termination of a foetus from the moment of its first recognisable movement in the womb 211 is unlawful under common law. 212 However, the termination of a foetus prior to quickening appears not to be proscribed under common law. 213 The common law, where it operates, provides a two tiered approach to abortion -permitting the abortion of a pre-quickened foetus and proscribing the abortion of a quickened foetus. 214 Such an approach fails to adequately protect the right to life of unborn children, especially given the fact that the large majority of abortions take place early in pregnancy before quickening. 215 This approach is also one fraught with uncertainty due to the fact that 'quickening' is an occurrence that cannot be properly fixed to a point in the pregnancy period. 216 For these reasons, the common law is not an adequate safeguard of the right to life of unborn children.
However, it was England's first abortion statute in 1803 that first prohibited the abortion of a pre-quickened foetus. 217 This article will now turn to how effectively contemporary Australian statutes safeguard the right to life of unborn children.
New South Wales
In NSW, abortion is ostensibly unlawful. 218 That is, whilst the NSW criminal law proscribes abortion, 219 case law has opened the gate for abortions to occur through its liberal interpretation of what circumstances justify an abortion.
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NSW case law also demonstrates that the notion of a 'lawful abortion' is 212 Waller, above n 214, 38; see also ibid 134-5. 213 uncertain and 'open to subjective interpretation'. 221 This is an untenable situation that seriously undermines the NSW criminal law's 222 ability to protect unborn children's right to life. 223 The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 224 ostensibly proscribes abortion during any stage of pregnancy. Section 82 provides that a pregnant woman who 'unlawfully administers to herself any drug … or unlawfully uses any instrument … with intent … to procure her miscarriage' is liable to ten years imprisonment. Section 83 provides that any person who 'unlawfully administers to … any woman, whether with child or not, any drug … or unlawfully uses any instrument … with intent … to procure her miscarriage' is liable to ten years imprisonment. Section 84 provides that any person who 'unlawfully supplies or procures any drug … or any instrument … knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman' is liable to five years imprisonment. Whilst these provisions appear to safeguard an unborn child's right to life, the very few cases that have come before NSW courts show that the protection of the right is far from absolute or certain. 225 The central issue that undermines the NSW criminal law's absolute protection of an unborn child's life is the definition applied by the courts to what constitutes 'unlawful' within the abortion provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 226 In R v Wald, 227 the Court suitably followed the decision in R v Davidson; 228 namely, by stating that the word 'unlawfully' implies that there must be circumstances where abortions are 'lawful', and such circumstances are grounded in the principle of necessity where the mother's life or health is at serious risk. 229 Importantly, R v Wald 230 was taken to establish unequivocally that the defence of necessity for an offence under section 83 is available only for the medical profession. 232 This was to ensure that any such abortion must be 'skilfully performed by qualified medical practitioners with the woman's consent' 233 in order to properly safeguard the woman's health, this being the reason why the abortion was carried out in the first place. 234 Levine DCJ in that case also expanded -in his discussion of the principle of necessity 235 -the grounds that may be considered to cause a serious threat to a pregnant woman's mental or physical health. He included non-medical grounds, that is, grounds based on social and economic factors. 236 Whilst these are ostensibly non-medical factors, they are considered only when they may pose a serious danger to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman. 237 However, Levine DCJ limited the period during which the serious danger may materialise to 'the currency of the pregnancy, if uninterrupted'. 238 Such limitation is clearly problematic 239 and will be discussed shortly. In summary, whilst the NSW criminal law's protection of an unborn child's life is by no means absolute, the exceptions are appropriate and necessary and do not in any way confer upon women a 'right to an abortion'. 240 Whilst the lack of absolute protection in NSW for unborn children is appropriate when guided by the principle of necessity, the uncertainty surrounding the principle's application in NSW is a real and significant issue. This uncertainty was brought to light in CES v Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd ('Superclinics'), 241 which was a NSW civil case, brought on appeal to the NSW Supreme Court, and which dealt with a medical negligence matter. The case was brought against a number of medical practitioners for failing to diagnose the plaintiff's pregnancy. 242 However, before dealing with the issue of uncertainty, it is worth considering what contribution Superclinics 243 made to the law of abortion in NSW.
The Supreme Court in Superclinics 244 affirmed the rules espoused in R v Wald 245 regarding the circumstances that make abortion necessary, 246 but in the process the Court also made a novel ruling that is worth mentioning. In considering the decision of R v Wald, 247 regarding when abortions are lawful, Kirby ACJ was critical of Levine DCJ's decision to limit to 'the currency of the pregnancy, if uninterrupted', 248 the period in which any serious danger to the pregnant woman's physical or mental health may materialise. 249 Kirby ACJ held that a medical practitioner should be permitted to consider the health risks that the continuing pregnancy poses to a pregnant woman beyond the uninterrupted period of the pregnancy alone. 250 After all, if one has accepted that social and economic circumstances are proper considerations in assessing the health implications of a pregnancy for a pregnant woman, it is illogical to exclude these considerations after the child is born. This is because it is generally then that social and economic factors play their most significant part. 251 This article accepts that Kirby ACJ's comments are appropriate given the serious risks posed to a woman's psychological health after childbirth; 252 the decision is a far cry from allowing abortion on demand.
253 So, whilst Superclinics 254 has allowed post-birth consequences to be taken into account in determining the necessity of an abortion, the actual decision as to whether or not an abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's health is one to be made by medical practitioners alone. 255 255 Ibid 60, 67; Drabsch, above n 224, 22-4. Note that the term 'medical practitioners' is taken to include those health professionals who are able to assess both physical and mental risks to health -that is, general practitioners, surgeons, psychiatrists, and so forth.
provides a balanced and appropriate safeguard to the health of pregnant women and the lives of unborn children in NSW.
256
Turning now to the problematic matter of uncertainty, Superclinics 257 highlights the uncertainty associated with applying the 'necessity principle' to abortion cases. Superclinics 258 was heard in the first instance by Newman J in the NSW Supreme Court and later, on appeal, in the NSW Court of Appeal. 259 The substantive law applied in both instances -that is, in the first instance and then on appeal -was identical; both courts considered and applied R v Davidson 260 and R v Wald.
261
The issue with the two Superclinics 262 decisions is that the Court of Appeal decided differently from the court of first instance (the NSW Supreme Court) as to whether or not a 'serious danger' to the woman's mental health existed at the relevant time due to the pregnancy. 263 In the first instance the NSW Supreme Court found that an abortion under the circumstances would be unlawful, whereas the NSW Court of Appeal found that under the very same circumstances an abortion would be lawful. 264 This brings into sharp focus 'the uncertain, and therefore unsatisfactory, state of the law' in NSW with regard to whether or not an abortion is lawful due to a pregnancy posing a 'serious danger' to a mother's health. 268 This lack of certainty undermines what would otherwise be quite effective protection under NSW law of the lives of unborn children. 269 It is a significant failing because it sends a message to the NSW justice and prosecuting agencies that the enforcement of abortion crimes is too risky an undertaking to be worthwhile, due to the substantial costs associated with such prosecutions and the considerable uncertainty of the outcome. 270 Whilst it is lamentable that the criminal law in NSW has a significant chink in its protection of the lives of unborn children, this is something that could be addressed with the necessary political will. All that is required is some legislative provision detailing specific criteria by which a court can judge a 'serious danger' to the health of a mother, and which would make very clear and certain when an abortion is lawful. 271 When that happens the criminal law in NSW will be able more effectively to discharge one of its purposes: to protect the lives of unborn children and prevent abortion on demand insidiously infiltrating society. 272 However, it is worth pointing out that the 2006 case of Dr Sood illustrates that NSW has not dropped its guard in the protection of unborn children and its criminal law retains some degree of potency. 273 Dr Sood was found guilty in the NSW Supreme Court under section 83 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for failing 'to make the requisite inquiries in order to satisfy herself of the necessity to terminate the pregnancy'. 274 At the time in question, Dr Sood had 'a history of malpractice and fraud complaints behind her'. 275 She was ultimately guilty of 276 not looking into the grounds for the pregnant woman's request for an abortion, 277 even though the Court found that if Dr Sood had carried out the necessary inquiries, it would have been open for her to form the belief that a termination would be necessary in the circumstances.
278 Dr Sood's conviction generated a great deal of public attention, 279 which served to publicise the need for doctors to diligently inquire into a request for an abortion to ensure that such a procedure is carried out only in circumstances of necessity. 280 The case also served to highlight that there is no abortion on demand in NSW and unborn children are protected under NSW law.
281
In light of the discussion on NSW, this article contends that the criminal law in that State does promote the right to life of unborn children, but its uncertainty with regard to what constitutes a 'serious danger' undermines its effectiveness. Nevertheless, NSW has demonstrated in its successful prosecution of Dr Sood that its abortion provisions under the Crimes Act 282 are potent and deserve respect.
The disturbing facts in the Dr Sood case also demonstrate the real need for adequate protection for unborn children. The medication that Dr Sood provided to the pregnant woman to induce a late-term abortion induced her into labour and she delivered a baby at home in a toilet bowl. 283 The woman and the baby were taken to hospital where -critical to the tragedy of this whole saga -medical staff observed signs of life in the baby; but because the child's condition was inconsistent with survival, the medical staff made no attempt to resuscitate him. 284 Poignantly, the Court grappled with the real issue of whether or not the child was born alive. 285 What is certain is that these disturbing and tragic facts make it clear that abortions must be properly controlled through use of the principle of necessity. Effective criminal laws are needed to ensure that abortions not driven by necessity do not arise, or, when they do arise, they are properly dealt with by way of criminal prosecution.
Queensland
The law with regard to abortion in Queensland is in many respects similar to that of NSW. 286 Therefore, this article will deal only with the salient aspects of Queensland's abortion law. 280 Section 225 provides that '[a]ny woman who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage,…unlawfully administers to herself any poison…or uses any force of any kind … or permits such thing or means to be administered or used to her' is liable to seven years imprisonment. 290 Section 226 provides that '[a]ny person who unlawfully supplies to or procures for any person anything whatsoever, knowing that it is intended to be unlawfully used to procure the miscarriage of a woman' is liable to three years imprisonment.
291
In many respects, these provisions are similar to those in NSW and their interpretation is therefore influenced to a large extent by the same case law.
292
Whilst the aforementioned provisions create offences relating to unlawful abortions, section 282 293 provides a statutory defence to doctors who carry out abortions via surgical operations or medical treatment, so long as the operation or treatment was conducted 'in good faith and with reasonable care and skill … to preserve the mother's life … [where such] … operation … or treatment [was] reasonable, having regard to … all the circumstances of the case'. 294 Therefore, like NSW, Queensland punishes with criminal sanctions those who perform abortions; but, unlike NSW, Queensland provides a statutory defence for medical practitioners. However, this defence provision appears to be intended to expressly protect doctors in circumstances where a patient is unable to provide consent due to unconsciousness, and so forth. 295 Therefore, the case law determining circumstances in which abortions are deemed lawful and unlawful still applies in Queensland.
The significant cases on abortion in Queensland centre on the legal question of what constitutes a 'lawful abortion'. 297 In K v T, 298 the Court held that the principle of necessity as outlined in R v Davidson 299 represents the law in Queensland with regard to when an abortion is lawful. 300 This position was endorsed later in R v Bayliss and Cullen 301 in which McGuire J stressed, whilst supporting the R v Davidson 302 defence of necessity, that the defence is not available to excuse the termination of 'every inconvenient conception' and that only 'in exceptional cases' will abortions be deemed lawful. 303 The point on which the law in Queensland possibly differs from that of NSW is the question of whether or not social and economic factors could be considered in assessing whether a serious danger to a pregnant woman's health exists. 304 The effect of these decisions is that the availability of abortions in Queensland is more restricted than in NSW due in part to the uncertainty around whether or not R v Wald 308 applies. 309 Another important case on what constitutes a 'lawful abortion' is Veivers v Connolly, 310 which was a civil case. The critical aspect of this case, for the purpose of this article, is that the court came to a similar conclusion to the court in Superclinics 311 -the conclusion that, in determining whether an abortion is lawful, any relevant danger to the mental health of the pregnant woman need not arise during the pregnancy, but could arise after the child's birth. 312 However, only Kirby ACJ in Superclinics 313 determined that the R v Wald 314 test 315 could be extended to the consideration of health effects on mothers after the birth of their children. 316 The remaining uncertainty around whether or not social or economic factors play a part in determining the lawfulness of an abortion therefore continues to hamper access to abortion in Queensland. 317 Whilst the more restricted availability of abortion in Queensland 318 is welcomed in the interests of safeguarding the lives of unborn children, there needs to be a properly balanced, certain and effective safeguard to ensure that the health of pregnant women is not unduly jeopardised simply because medical practitioners fear possible prosecution under the Queensland criminal jurisdiction. 319 This article contends that, to fulfil this need, social and economic factors should certainly be taken into account when the impact that a pregnancy may have on the physical and mental health of a pregnant woman is being assessed. The current uncertainty around this area of the law in Queensland improperly causes the gate-keepers of abortion in Queenslandthe medical profession -to hesitate and even deny an abortion in circumstances where social and economic factors bear heavily on the health of a pregnant woman. 320 Therefore, legislation should be passed to make certain the factors that could be considered in assessing the 'serious danger' to the health of pregnant women. Such legislation would instil confidence in medical practitioners in the decisions they make and safeguard them from criminal prosecution. 321 Notwithstanding the uncertainty around Queensland's acceptance of R v Wald, 322 the situation in Queensland is that in general terms its criminal law serves to promote the right to life of unborn children. The law in Queensland remains a 'guardian of the silent innocence of the unborn' and uses its power to ensure that 'abortion on whim or caprice does not insidiously filter into … society'. 323 There is no abortion on demand in Queensland, 324 and this position is reinforced by the recent prosecution of a Queensland couple for procuring their own abortion.
325
C Issues with Disparate Approaches by Jurisdictions to Criminal Statutes on Abortion
This article illustrates that one Australian jurisdiction can be poles apart from another in the position it takes on abortion. 326 Whilst there is no doubt that the jurisdictions which have a liberal attitude towards abortion fail to promote the right to life of unborn children, the issue that needs to be considered is how these liberal jurisdictions undermine the conservative jurisdictions' efforts to protect the lives of unborn children through their respective criminal laws.
The practical effect of the lack of uniformity in abortion laws across Australia is that one jurisdiction's effort to protect the lives of unborn children is easily circumvented by pregnant women travelling to a liberal jurisdiction in search of an abortion. 327 For example, residents of NSW and Queensland have ample time to travel to Victoria or the ACT for an abortion. This is because 99.3 percent of abortions throughout Australia take place before 20 weeks gestation, 328 and such abortions would be legal and a matter of a pregnant woman's discretion in Victoria and the ACT. 329 Unlike criminal offences such as murder, robbery, theft, deception, serious assault and rape, an abortion is something that can be carefully considered, planned and, most critically, transferred to an accommodating liberal jurisdiction. It is extremely rare for a woman not to have an early notification of her pregnancy; in fact, whilst Superclinics 330 illustrates a failure on the part of doctors to diagnose the plaintiff's pregnancy until she was 19.5 weeks pregnant, she was very suspicious quite early on that she was expecting a child. 331 All these factors conspire to allow individuals seeking abortions to 'forum shop' across jurisdictions to circumvent the practical effect of existing criminal laws proscribing abortion. 332 The availability of abortions at the discretion of pregnant women in liberal jurisdictions also serves to undermine the moral authority of the law in conservative jurisdictions. Of all the criminal prosecutions discussed, Dr Sood's matter stands out as the only one returning a guilty verdict. 333 But, even after acknowledging the 'seriousness of the offences committed by … [Dr] Sood', 334 the Court nevertheless decided to impose a non-custodial sentence. 335 To say this is not to criticise judicial decisions or prosecution outcomes; it is merely to highlight the fact that a prosecution may not result in a sentence with any meaningful deterrence value.
Even when a prosecution is brought, the public outcry against the prosecution is almost deafening -as was the case in the recent prosecution against Leach and Brennan in Queensland. 336 The arguments commonly used to criticise the legal position in the 'pro-life' jurisdictions generally involve highlighting the liberal position of the law in 'pro-choice' jurisdictions. 337 It appears, therefore, that the moral underpinning of abortion laws in jurisdictions such as NSW and Queensland is seriously undermined by the lack of uniformity in Australia's abortion laws.
338
This article contends that there needs to be uniformity in Australia's approach to abortion in order for the criminal law in conservative jurisdictions to effectively promote the right to life of unborn children. Forum shopping circumvents the laws controlling and restricting abortion and renders them ineffective, and 'pro-choice' jurisdictions undermine the moral authority of such laws.
On this second point, a quote from Horace Rumpole in the fictitious work of John Mortimer serves in part to illustrate the matter: 'You're not concerned with the law, Members of the Jury … you are concerned with justice!' 339 The temptation for juries to step outside their strict legal role of tribunals of fact is perhaps evident when we consider whether or not juries in abortion cases in pro-life jurisdictions are going to convict a person, and thereby possibly send that person to gaol, for doing what is allowed elsewhere. It is a valid question -one this article does not seek to answer, only to consider. What is certain is that there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of all Australian governments to establish a uniform approach promoting the right to life of unborn children -anything less will undoubtedly continue to sabotage the current efforts of pro-life jurisdictions.
340
D Public Policy on the Right to Life for Unborn Children
In establishing the need for a uniform approach to abortion laws across Australia to protect the lives of unborn children, this article will now briefly put forth recommendations of public policy for consideration.
Naturally, to achieve uniformity in abortion laws across Australia, it needs to be established what the Australian position is. Currently, there appears to be an avalanche of support for decriminalising abortion and making abortion a 338 See generally Rankin, 'Contemporary Australian Abortion Law', above n 105, 235; Dixon, above n 297, 16. Both articles highlight the relatively easy access to abortion in the pro-life States of NSW and Queensland. 339 John Mortimer, Rumpole à la Carte in The Third Rumpole Omnibus (Penguin Books, 1998) 265. 340 Drabsch, above n 224, 50. matter of personal choice for women. 341 However, this article contends that the state must exercise its 'responsibility as guardian of the silent innocence of the unborn' and use its authority to prevent the occurrence of abortions on demand. 342 The argument that women should be free to choose abortion is critically flawed when one considers that invoking this freedom results in the destruction of innocent life -at least the potential life of an unborn child. 343 With such a significant interest being put at risk through the legalisation of abortion on demand, a safeguard is necessary to ensure that abortions take place only as a matter of necessity. 344 It is the contention of this article that this should be the Australian legal position.
This article contends that the existing criminal law safeguards in pro-life jurisdictions such as NSW and Queensland could be improved to ensure legal certainty for all relevant stakeholders, namely medical staff and pregnant women. Legislation should spell out in the clearest terms possible the circumstances that necessitate an abortion and thus make it lawful. The issue of what clearly constitutes 'serious danger' should be addressed to ensure that it is not 'open to subjective interpretation' by the courts. 345 The question of whether or not social and economic factors attributable to the pregnancy can be considered in determining whether any serious danger exists to the health of the mother should be put to rest; these factors should be considered, as they do on occasion play seriously on the mind of pregnant women, seriously undermining their health. 346 With a uniform pro-life legal policy on abortion coupled with these improvements, Australian law can serve to protect the weakest in the community -unborn children 347 -and safeguard their right to life, whilst giving due respect to the health concerns of pregnant women. 348 It should therefore be a matter of policy that abortions in Australia only take place as a matter of necessity.
V CONCLUSION
travelling to jurisdictions that permit abortions on demand. The existence of pro-choice laws in liberal jurisdictions also undermines the moral authority of the legal stance of conservative jurisdictions. All in all, this lack of a uniform approach in Australia to the protection of the right to life of unborn children sabotages existing safeguards put in place by pro-life jurisdictions.
This article contends that there needs to be a uniform approach to the question of abortion in Australia. The criminal law needs to be improved to make clear to medical staff, pregnant women and members of the community that abortion is allowed only in circumstances of necessity and to provide certainty as to what constitutes such circumstances. For a few jurisdictions to adopt this approach on their own will be largely ineffective, leaving the most vulnerable, silent and defenceless in Australian society without legal protection. This should not be allowed to happen.
